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JUDGMENTS AGAINST TRUSTEES

JUDGMENTS AGAINST TRUSTEES THEIR
FORCE AND EFFECT
Herbert Becker*
In recent years there has been an enormous growth in
the creation of trusts of every kind. With the highly
efficient organizations of trust companies, more testators
have created trusts by their wills and family settlement
trusts by trust agreements inter vivos have become quite
common. Subdividers of great tracts of land have found,
it expedient to market their title through responsible
trustees. Various modern inventions of financing real
estate transactions, notably land trust certificates, require
the medium of a trustee. The ownership of co-operative
apartment buildings is most effectively accomplished for
the benefit of the, co-operative apartment owners by
placing the title of the property in a trustee, and lastly,
many business enterprises are now being conducted under
trust agreements known as common law or Massachusetts trusts. These and a great variety of other transactions are bringing the business world more and more
into contact with trustees and the vast amount of business transacted by trustees makes it a matter of practical
importance to consider the effect of a judgment against
a trustee; how such a judgment is enforced; against
whom it may be enforced; and how a trustee may protect
himself from personal liability on his trust obligations.
An exhaustive search of the books has not disclosed a
great abundance of material on this subject, but there is
sufficient to be able to make an analysis, which it is hoped
may be useful. In passing it may be said that there
is no distinction in regard to the subject under consideration between a trustee under a will, in a deed or a common law trust agreement.
*Vice President, Chicago Title and Trust Company.
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For convenience, the subject may be best considered
under five sub-heads:
1. Is a judgment against a trustee as such a lien upon
the real estate held by the trustee in his capacity as
trustee ?
2. May real estate held by the judgment debtor in his
capacity as trustee be sold under an execution based upon
such judgment?
3. Is such a judgment a lien on the real estate of the
judgment debtor owned by him in his own right?
4. Is there any form of judgment known to the law
under which a judgment creditor may enforce his judgment against the trust estate?
5. How may a trustee protect himself from personal
liability on his trust obligations?
EXAMPLE

Let us suppose for example that John Doe, duly acting
as trustee with the power to borrow money, in the exercise of his power, borrows the sum of $1,000.00 and
signs his name to a note, "John Doe, as trustee." He
fails to pay the note, is sued in an action at law, and a
judgment is recovered against him "as trustee." As
trustee, under the same trust, John Doe holds the title
to real estate. The judgment debtor causes execution to
issue upon his judgment, levies on the real estate held by
John Doe, as trustee, and sells it under the execution.
This example will be referred to from time to time to
illustrate the various points made in the course of this
discussion.
1 AND 2
Sub-heads 1 and 2 are so closely connected that they
may be discussed practically as one subject. At the every
outset it may be definitely stated that the judgment given
in our example is not a lien upon the trust property and
the trust property cannot be sold at an execution sale.
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Before proceeding to a demonstration of these propositions, it is essential to constantly bear in mind that
trusts are the subjects exclusively of equity jurisdiction.
With this always in mind it is easy to understand the conclusions here reached. In general, then, trust property
cannot be subjected to the claims of creditors by proceedings at law. There is excluded from this discussion the
matter of judgment liens and execution sales of real
estate, the title of which is held by a trustee under a
secret trust. Such a title may in Illinois be sold on execution. In this respect the law of Illinois is different from
the law of other States. This is due to the working of
our recording act. Emmons v. Moore, 85 Ill. 308; Home
Bank v. Peoria Trotting Society, 206 Ill. 11. Some
authorities will be referred to from other jurisdictions
where secret trusts were involved, but where there was
no recording act. The principles of those authorities are
applicable here.
A few quotations from the leading authorities on this
subject will serve to illustrate that a judgment against a
trustee is not a lien on real estate held by such trustee in
trust. Thus in Huntt v. Townsend, 31 Md. 336, the
Supreme Court of Maryland, referring to a judgment
against trustees, said
"Such a proceeding is a breach of trust, and a judgment so confessed is not a lien upon the trust property."

In Boardman v. Willard, 73 Iowa 20, the title was in
"George F. Woolston, trustee." A judgment was rendered against him as trustee. The Court said:
"The judgment was not a lien * * * for all the plaintiff obtained * * * was a lien on the interest of Woolston. If he had
none, the plaintiff got none."

In Wright v. FranklinBank, 59 Ohio State 80, 92, the
Court said:
"Judgments against the trustee are not liens upon the lands held
by him in trust for another."
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Theholdings of these Courts are further substantiated
by the following authorities: 15 R. C. L. 807; Black on
Judgments, Sec. 421; Hays v. Reger, 102 Ind. 524;
Thomas v. Kennedy, 24 Ia. 397.
It being clear, therefore, that a judgment against John
Doe, as trustee is not a lien on real estate which John
Doe holds as trustee, it must inevitably follow that such
real estate cannot be sold on execution. Indeed this is
the law and it will require very few citations to illustrate this.
The leading case is probably Moore v. Stemmons, 119
Mo. Appeal, 162 in which a judgment had been recovered against the trustees in their capacities as trustees.
The judgment creditor had caused an execution to be
issued and a levy to be made upon the trust property.
The proceeding before the Supreme Court was a motion
to quash the execution, which was granted. The Court
said:
"An execution issued upon a judgment cannot be levied upon
not be made to run against trust property."
In Mallory v. Clark, 9 Abbott's Practice Reports, 358,
it was said:
"An exexcution issued upon a judgment cannot be levied upon
the trust estate."

In Osterman v. Baldwin, 6 Wall, 122, the Supreme
Court of the United States held that no title would pass
by a sale of trust property under an execution. The
Court said:
"If Holman had the bare, naked, legal title, without any
beneficial interest in the property sold, and no possession, nothing
passed by the sale."
Other authorities supporting this proposition are Lee
v. Wrixon, 37 Wash. 50; Smith v. McCann, 24 How.
398; 1 Freeman on Executions, Sec. 173; 23 C. J. p. 343;
11 Am. and Eng. Encyc. of Law, p. 634; Kleber on
Judicial and Execution Sales, Sec. 342; and Hussey v.
Arnold, 185 Mass. 202.
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The cases referred to do not all involve judgments
which run against the debtor as trustee. Some involve
judgments against the debtors individually, but as we
shall see, there is no difference between these cases in
principle, because a judgment against "John Doe" and a
judgment against "John Doe, as trustee" have the same
force and effectt. They are both personal judgments.
Therefore, the mode of enforcing the judgments is the
same in this-that neither can be enforced against the
trust property by any proceeding at law. In equity, of
course, it becomes a matter of importance whether the
judgment is based upon the individual liability of John
Doe or wk-ther the debt upon which it was based was
incurred for the benefit of the trust estate. If it is the
individual obligation of John Doe, in no event, either at
law or in equity, can the trust estate be subjected to the
payment of the debt. If, however, John Doe incurred
the debt as trustee within his powers and for the benefit
of the trust estate (in accordance with our example given
at the outset), while the trust estate cannot at law be
subjected to the payment of the debt, yet in equity it can.
See Hussey v. Arnold, 185 Mass. 202 and Zehnbar v.
Spillman, 6 Southern 214 (Fla.). The cases are therefore, all in point, regardless of the form of the judgment.
Some of the cases referred to involve almost the identical
situation stated in our example. It is a remarkable fact
that there appears to be no conflict in the cases found on
this subject, from which it may be seen with what zeal
courts of equity prevent interference with trusts by courts
of law and how uniformly courts of law apply the principle of "hands off" to trust estates.
There is another important consideration in this connection, namely, that the rights of the beneficiaries are
not and cannot be concluded by a judgment against a
trustee. In such a proceeding beneficiaries are not parties.
To subject their property to the lien of a judgment or to
a sale upon execution based on a judgment rendered in a
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proceeding at law in which they had no opportunity to be
heard, would require the amendment of several constitutions. Black in his work on judgments in Section 585
says:
"The general rule is that in all proceedings affecting the trust
estate, whether brought by or against third persons, the trustees
and cestui que trust are so far independent of each other that the

latter must be made a party to the suit in order to be bound by the
judgment or decree rendered therein."
3
We may now proceed to consider what effect the judgment rendered in our example will have on the individual
property of John Doe. Is the judgment a lien upon John
Doe's individual real estate even though it was incurred
pursuant to powers given to John Doe as trustee and was
for the benefit of the trust estate? The judgment is a
lien upon John Doe's individual real estate. This follows from the law that the judgment thus rendered is a
personal judgment and, of course, it being a personal
judgment, it is enforcible against the individual property
of the debtor, John Doe. Whatever may be the effect of
the word "as" when placed before the word "trustee" in
the laws of deeds, it is absolutely without force in the law
of contracts and judgments. Contracts by or judgments
against "John Doe," "John Doe, trustee," or "John
Doe, as trustee" have the same force and effect. They
are all personal contracts and judgments. In Duvall v.
Craig, 2 Wheat. 45, the Supreme Court of the United
States said:
If a trustee "chooses to bind himself by a personal covenant, he
is liable at law for a breach thereof in the same manner as any
other person, although he describes himself as convenanting as
trustee, for in such case the covenant binds him personally, and the
addition of the word 'as trusee' is but a matter of description

In Dunham v. Blood, 207 Mass. 512, the Court said:
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"When a trustee, even if he is authorized to do so, borrows
money in behalf of his trust and gives a note 'as trustee' the note
is his individual note * * *."

To the same effect is Carr v. Leahy, 217 Mass. 440;
Taylor v. Davis, 110 U. S. 330; and Wahl v. Schmidt,
307 Ill., 341.
These authorities establish conclusively the proposition that a note or contract signed by "John Doe, as
trustee" is his personal note or contract. It follows,
therefore, that a personal judgment not only may be, but
is the only kind which can be rendered against John Doe.
Only three authorities were found which discussed this
point. They were Hussey v. Arnold, Zehnbar v. Spfillman and Huntt v. Townsend supra. In Hussey's case
the Court said:
"Actions at law upon such contracts must be brought against
them and judgments run against them personally."

In the Zehnbar case, the Court said:
"It is their personal note and the judgment would be a personal
judgment against them to be satisfied out of their own property."

And in the Huntt case, the Court stated:
"Such a judgment can only bind the individual property of the
parties who confess it."

The creditor of John Doe, who has secured a judgment against John Doe, as trustee, is therefore, not without remedy. He may collect his judgment against John
Doe individually by execution and sale of John Doe's individual property. However, the creditor is not required
to sue at law. In our example the creditor had a more
direct remedy. He could have subjected the trust estate
to the payment of the debt incurred by the trustee by a
proceeding in equity against the trust property. To this
proceeding in equity the trustee and the beneficiaries
would be made parties defendant. In equity the court
may subject the trust property to the payment of the
debt. Authority, if any be necessary for this point, is
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found in the few cases on this subject. We quote again
from Mallory v. Clark in which the court commented on
this remedy in these words:
"An execution of law could never be maintained to reach the
estate by making the trustee defendant, but for such purpose resort
must be had to a proceeding in equity."
In Hussey v. Arnold supra, the Supreme Court of
Massachusetts said:
"Such debts, if proper charges upon the trust estate, can be paid
from it under authority of a court of equity."
In Zehnbar v. Spillman supra, this language occurs:
"In short, the trust property cannot be reached except by a proceeding in chancery to which the cestui que trustent must be made
parties."

The creditor's remedy is thus two-fold. He may
recover a judgment at law against John Doe, which is enforcible against John Doe's individual property or he
may proceed in equity to subject the trust estate to the
payment of the debt. The question immediately arises
as to John Doe's recourse in the case where a judgment
has been recovered against him as trustee and he has
been compelled to pay it to avoid an execution sale of his
individual property. Needless to say, John Doe, as
trustee, has a remedy against the trust estate. In our
example, he clearly has a remedy because he had the
power to sign the note and incur the debt upon which
the judgment was rendered. It is obvious if the creation
of the debt was a breach of trust or he had no authority
whatever for it, John Doe would have no recourse
against the trust property.
The Supreme Court of the United States in Taylor v.
Davis supra comments upon this in the following words:
"Of course, when a trustee acts in good faith for the benefit
of the trust, he is entitled to indemnify himself for his engagements out of the estate in his hands and for this purpose a credit
for his expenditures will be allowed in his accounts by the court
having jurisdiction thereof."
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Another question of interest is whether any form of
judgment is known to the law under which trust property
can be sold at an execution sale based upon a judgment
at law against the trustee. An analogy might be sought
in the prevalent form of judgments against receivers,
which is made to run against "A, as receiver, to be paid
out of the funds held by him as receiver." See McNulta
V. Ensch, 134 Ill. 48. A similar form is used in judgments against executors and administrators. But due to
the jealous exclusiveness of the jurisdiction of courts of
equity over trusts and trustees, no form of judgment can
be devised which the courts will recognize as the basis
for subjecting trust property to an execution sale.
Judge Storey said in Duvall v. Craig supra:
"It is plain * * * there could have been no other judgment

rendered against them (the trustees) for at law a judgment
against a trustee in such special capacity is utterly unknown."
In Moore v. Stemmons, already referred to, the judgment against the trustee contained an express direction
for satisfaction of the judgment out of the trust property. This judgment apparently attempted to follow
the form of judgments used in cases of receivers. In
setting aside the judgment, the Supreme Court of Missouri said:
"An execution upon a judgment or decree against the trustee
cannot be made to run against the trust property."
In the Zehnbar case the order for the issue of the
execution directed that execution be levied upon and collected out of the trust property. The Supreme Court of
Florida expunged the order with these words:
"There is no authority of law for such an order."
In view of these decisions it is safe to assume that
judgment against "John Doe, as trustee" is a personal
judgment againt John Doe, regardless of any language
in the judgment intended to give it any other effect.
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It remains now to consider one more aspect of the
subject, namely the manner by which a trustee may protect himself from personal liability in dealing with trust
matters and incurring debts on behalf of the trust estate.
As has been before shown, to sign a contract or note
"as trustee" is to incur merely a personal obligation. But
if a trustee should sign a note "As trustee, and not individually," he thereby relieves himself from personal liability and no personal judgment, in fact, no judgment
whatever should be rendered against him. Any similar
stipulation added to the words "as trustee" to the effect that the trustee shall not be personally liable will
protect him. In such case no judgment should be rendered against the trustee, but the creditor must resort
to a court of equity and there subject the trust property
to the payment of the debt. Of course, as before stated,
the trust estate is liable only in the event the trustee had
the power to incur the debt or incurred the debt for the
benefit of the trust estate. If the trustee, however, even
in the face of a stipulation protecting him against personal responsibility, suffers a judgment to be rendered
against him at law the judgment would be a personal
judgment. The stipulation would be only a defense
against the judgment before it is entered. If not asserted, the judgment becomes a valid personal judgment.
This manner of protecting himself against personal
liability is specifically recognized by the cases. Thus in
Carr v. Leahy, 217 Mass. 440, the court referred to
this method as follows:
"If a trustee contracting for the benefit of a trust wants to
protect himself from individual liability on the contract, he must
stipulate that he is not to be personally responsible, but that the
other party is to look solely to the trust estate."

And in Justin v. Parker,317 Ill. 354, the court said:
"The rule is well settled that a guardian, executor, administrator, trustee, or other person acting in such relation, in a con-
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tract with third persons binds himself personally, unless he exacts an agreement from the person with whom he contracts to
look to the funds of the estate exclusively; and this is true regardless of whether the charge is one for which the trustee may
be reimbursed from the trust estate, as that is a matter wholly
between him and the beneficiaries of the trust."

We may now concluded by summarizing the matters
herein considered as follows:
(1) If the obligation is created by the trustee within
his authority and he properly limits his liability, then
the trustee cannot be made personally liable, but the
trust estate is liable in equity.
(2) If the obligation is created by the trustee within
his authority, but he does not properly limit his liability,
then the trustee is personally liable and a judgment may
be rendered against him which will be a personal judgment. The trustee, if compelled to pay the judgment,
may require the trust estate to reimburse him. The
creditor may also pursue the trust estate in equity if he
chooses.
(3) If the obligation is created by the trustee without authority, then he is, of course, personally liable and
the trust estate can under no circumstances be subjected
to the payment of the obligation.
(4) In no event can any of the obligations of the
trustee be enforced against the trust estate at law.

